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CURING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL RESEARCH:
IMPOSSIBLE DREAMIS AND HARSH REALITIES
PATRICIA C. KUSZLER, M-D.J.D."
"Conflicts of interest are of concern because of their potential effect on the
quality, outcome, and dissemination of research, as well as their effects on the
public's perception of and trust in researchers and universities."'
"Academic medical institutions are themselves growingincreasingly beholden
2
to industry."
'Tatients died prematurely in two failed clinical trials ... experiments using

drugs in which the center and its doctors had a financial interest"'
These three quotes from recent high profile articles on conflicts of interest
present but the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Even as we laud numerous medical
advances-better drugs, devices and procedures-there are nagging concerns
that alleged research successes are tainted by the quest for dollars, prestige, and
power. Making the issue more pressing is the fact that an increasing number of
research subjects are involved, and arguably at risk, in clinical trials Making the
issue more public is the bright light of media attention focused on clinical trials
beset with conflicts of interest.5

Conflicts of interest in medicine, and more particularly in clinical research,
cover a wide range of activities, practices, and even accepted norms. For
example, in the context of non-experimental health care services, the American
public is increasingly concerned that managed care organizations are subverting
physician judgment with financial incentives and reward for doing less for the
hapless patient Studies demonstrate that physician prescriptive practices are
significantly affected by dollars and other benefits provided to them by the
* Professor, School of Law, University of Washington; Adjunct Professor, School of
Medicine; Adjunct Professor, School of Public Health and Community Mcdicine, University of
Washington. The author received her B.A. from Mfills College in 1974, her M.D. from Mayo
Medical School in 1978, and her J.D. from Yale Law School in 1991. The author thanks Nancy
McMarrer, Research Librarian, and Terry Price, Research Assisnt, for their invaluable assistance
and work.
1. Mildred K. Cho et al,Poides on Famly Confdsoflntet at US Unrmiff, 284 JAMA
2203,2203 (2000).
2. Marcia Angell, LrAa.mic.fe;dneForSak?,342NEWENG.J.MED. 1516,1516 (2000).
3. DuffW\ilson & David Heath, WhatPatientatTbeHu b'WcM AEter
tf
in Wih Thy Died,SEAT=B TIEs,Mar. 11, 2001, atAl.
4. Volunteer subjects increased from 502,000 in 1995 to over 700,000 in 1999-a 39%
increase. See Tom Abate, Aajbe ConffldsoffnftsrsarrScxing
wlTrddPam: Rt" Itt
t Blt~r
Ngative Media also Gtee CorVlaint Sure,S.F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 2001, at D1.
5. See id; Wilson & Heath, supra note 3; Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, FDA Haftr
Expriments On Genes at Universi, WASH. PosT,Jan. 22,2000, at Al.
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pharmaceutical industry.6 In the research context, our consciousness has been
brutally raised by high profile media exposures of blatant conflicts of interest,
allegedly responsible for the deaths of research subjects, and harmful
prolongation of unsuccessful research trials.' Most of these high profile cases
have focused on financial conflicts of interest. These financial conflicts include
not only dependence on industry sources for ongoing support of clinical
research, but also additional "downstream" revenue which may motivate
individual researchers and the academic research centers alike. Alas, financial
conflicts of interests are only one category of conflict compromising research
integrity.
This article will explore conflicts of interest in the context of clinical research,
focusing on the incentives and practices that foster such conflicts. Part I will
briefly define and categorize the revenue streams at play in clinical
research-both contemporaneous with the clinical trial, and the downstream,
long-term gains available to the researcher and research university. Part II will
discuss how these entangled revenue streams result in financial and non-financial
conflicts of interest that affect the nature and balance of the research enterprise
and potentially endanger patients and human subjects. Part III will summarize
current conflicts of interest regulations and policies, including methods for
addressing and preventing conflicts of interest. Finally, Part IV will suggest some
reforms to the current conflict of interest management strategies, with the
concession that, absent a major culture shift in research institutions and existing
law, conflicts of interest will continue to undermine confidence in the integrity
of the research enterprise.
I. FUNDING OF CLINICAL RESEARCH: THE ONCE AND FUTURE DOLLAR

Although lack of funding is frequently decried as a barrier to research, little
empirical evidence supports this hypothesis.' Clinical research is simultaneously
financed by several contemporaneous, intertwined funding streams. It is not
unusual for federal grant dollars, private industry support, third-party payments,
and direct patient payment to all be in play in a given clinical research project. In
addition to these present-day funding streams, there is also future revenue
potential for both the research university and the researcher in the form of equity
6. See Ashley Wazana, Phddaus andthe Pharmaudical1ndust y: Is a Gift EverJusta Git?,283

JAMA 373,375-76 (2000).
7. See Wilson & Heath, supranote 3; Donna Shalala, ProtedingResearrh Subjics- WhatMist
Be Done, 343 NEW ENG.J. MED. 808, 808 (2000).

8. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has done a thorough study of this issue and found that
this belief is based more on perception than reality. SeeNAT'LACAD. OPSCIENCES, INST. OIMED,
EXTENDING MEDICAREREIMBURSEMENTIN CLINICALTRIALS (HenryJ. Aaron & Helen Gelband
eds., 2000)

[hereinafter

MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT IN CLINICAL TRIALS], available at

http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9742.html.
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interests, royalties, and licensing fees from enterprises and products derived from
the research.
A Financngof C'nicalResearh:PresentDqy Funding Streams
Researchers and universities finance the costs of clinicalresearch from several
different sources. These include classical federal grant funding, contribution
from private sponsors such as pharmaceutical, medical device and biotechnology
firms, reimbursement from third party payers, and direct payments from the
patient/subject.
1. Federal Funding
Following World War II, the federal government heavily subsidized
biomedical research. The massive investment resulted in what has become
known as the "golden age" of research."0 Although federal research support
investment has been tempered by private industry sponsorship in recent years,
federal funding is still one of the mainstays for financing clinical research."
On the individual front, .esearch scientists and clinicians develop and test newv
drugs, devices, and procedures in research funded by federal grants. Typically,
this is in the form of salary support, usually phrased as a percentage of total work
effort. This compensation is funneled through the institutional employer-

9. The National Institutes of Health (NI),its companion institutes, and various bureaus
fund a broad scope of research, including cancer (National Cancer Institute (NCI)), heart disease
(National Heart, Lung and Blood institute), and mental health and substance abuse (Alcohol, Drug
Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA)). Se. INST. OF MED., FUNDING HEALTH
SCiENCES RESEARCH: A STRATEGY TO RESTORE BALANCE 37-39 (Floyd E. Bloom & Mari: A.
Randolph eds., 1990) [hereinafterFUNDINGHFALTHScIENcESRESEARC ]. In addition, numerous
other federal entities sponsor medical research and clinical trials, including the National Science
Foundation (NSF), Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Department of Veteran's Affairs,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Defene. Idat
38-47. Approximately two-thirds of federally sponsored research is conducted in academic
institutions, whereas only about a quarter is conducted in government-owned laboratories, such as
those on Nifs Bethesda campus. See iJ at 35. This decentralization is viewed as one of the key
reasons for America's research eminence. See id at 35-36. See alo Harold Varmus, SkatuaLeaur-BiomediclResearrhEnters the Stead State, 333 NEW ENG.J. MED. 811,812 (1995).
10. Despite its prominence, federal funding of research is relatively short.lived. Prior to
World War II, health researchwas financed primailyby industry, academic institutions, and private
philanthropy. SeeFUNDINGHEALTHSCIENCESRESEARCI, branote9,at32-34. Howeverin the
aftemath of the War, the federal government poured money and resources into medical research.
Id See alro Varmus, supra note 9, at 811-12
11. SeeKennethSutherjnDueker Bt.bguntson(:czmrr-trda.ioJ-Grrm. Dtelpd

BiomedicalTechnologes,52 FOOD & DRUG LJ.453,457-58 (1997).
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usually the university or the academic medical center.' 2 In the case of research
clinicians, this salary support will apply to their income as employees of the
university or academic medical center. 3 It is likely only one of the several income
streams enjoyed by the researcher.
The academic medical center will benefit financially from clinical research
through compensation by the government grantor for the costs it incurs for the
trial. These generally are skimmed off the top of the grant award as so-called
"indirect costs" oftheinstitution. 4 Itis not unusual for academic medical center
and university indirect costs to consume half of the grant award. In addition, the
academic medical center will benefit from federal grant awards by being able to
recapture salary of researchers who are supported by the grant. Most academic
researchers, although dependent on "soft money," do have the safety net of a
guaranteed salary from the university or medical center. Thus, when a grantee
receives a percentage of salary support from the grant, the institution will also
indirectly benefit by being freed from this percentage of the salary expense.
2. Private Sponsor Funding
Although the federal government has been the primary source of funding for
clinical research in the past, it has been superseded by private industry in the last
decade." There is a pronounced trend toward a greater percentage of research
being funded by the private sector." One study has shown that 28% of life
sciences faculty received private sponsor funding." In 1986, the private sector
funded 42% of health care research and development." By 1995, the private
sector's allocation of research dollars had risen to 52%." This equated to a three-

fold increase, from approximately $6 billion to $19 billion. 0 Thus, although

12. See, e.g. FUNDING HEALTH SCIENCES RESEARCH, supra note 9 (grants are disbursed
federal agencies to the institutional employers which, in turn, compensate the researcher).

by

13. I.

14. Private funding of research generally pertains to drug, device, and biologics research,
rather than to research on innovative new medical procedures. See PeterJ, Neumann & Eileen A.
Sandberg, Trendrin Healb Car R&D and Technold Innovation, HEALTH API ., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at
111,112.
15. See also Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Exiring Drug Pice
Conttrols? The UnreconiZedand UnenforcedReasotable Pddng Requirementslee osed Upon 1'alents Delivitg
in Whole or in ParfromFedera#yFundedResearch, 75 TUL L REV. 631,636 (2001).

16. See Neumann & Sandberg, supra note 14, at 112. See also Arno &Davis, steranote 15, at
636-37.
17. See Neumann & Sandberg, supra note 14, at 112. See alroAmo & Davis, supranote 15,at
636-37.
18. Neumann & Sandberg, supira note 14, at 111.

19. I(
20. 1 at 112.
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federal funding of research has incrementally increased over time, the private

funding has increased exponentially.
Research clinicians receive compensation from the sponsor for their work on
the clinical trial. This may be in the form of salary support, honoraria, or even
in some cases, per-head payment for recruitment of human subjects.2 ' The
researcher may also serve as the spokesperson for the new innovation. In return
for this activity, the researcher may receive additional compensation for
presenting the new technology or treatment at academic and industry meetings
and conferences.' Although this spokesperson role may be consistent with the
spirit of scientific exchange and academia, it may also serve a marketing function.
The latter is more likely as the product is nearing the end of the regulatory
approval process and is entering, or has entered, the commercial marketplace.
As such, it becomes a source of downstream financial gain.
3. Third Party Payers Funding Clinical Research

In the case of clinical research, the cost may be further defrayed by seeking
payment from a third party payer. Both the physician researcher and the
academic medical center will typically seek additional reimbursement from third
party payers.
While we once saw health care payers as insurers, the health insurer payer of
yesteryear has been supplanted by the self-insuring employer using a managed
care organization to administer the employee health benefit plan. The other big
payers, of course, are the federal and, to a lesser degree, state governments who
finance the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Health plans, whether public or private, seek to avoid paying for unproven or
speculative treatments. At the time Medicare was enacted in 1965, one of the
standards borrowed from the private health insurance market was the
requirement that care must be medically necessary and reasonable in order to be
21. See Elizabeth Boyd & Lisa A. BeroAxsujing Faculy Firda)&aianrfith Irk,rIo,
284JAMA 2209,2209 (2000). Fourteen percent of researchers reported that they had equity in the
private sponsor. Iot Thirty-four percent reported arrangements involving Tealdng engagements
and honoraria of $250 - $20,000 per year. lodThirty-three percent involved a paid consulting
arrangement on either an occasional or regular basis. Id Thirty-two percent involved paid board
or advisory board positions. I See alo Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drz TdarHik COIJ1.r
for Doctors,N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at Al; DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SFRVS., REcRUMNG
HUMAN SUBJECTS SAMPLE GuiDELINEs FOR PRAcrIcE, PUB. No. OEI-01-97-196, 8-11 (2000)
[hereinafter RECRUITING HUMAN SUBJECrS].
22. Pharmaceutical and other private sponsors pay physicians for their work in a clinical trial
at a substantially higher rate than do government grantors; for ezample, for oncology research,
physicians get a median payment of $750 per patient from the National Cancer Institute, as
compared to S2,500 per patient for industry sponsored trials. Set MEDICARE RIMBUlSEWENT IN
CLINICAL TRIALS, mpra note 8, at 41-42.
23. See id at 30.
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covered and reimbursed by Medicare.24 Therapies and technologies that are

"investigational" or "experimental" are not eligible for coverage.' Although this

coverage policy is frequently articulated by Medicare, Medicaid, and private third
party payers, there is considerable uncertainty as to how concretely this exclusion
is administered and maintained, even in the setting of regular treatment."
Despite a few targeted national coverage policies excluding coverage for
certain procedures, Medicare has been surprisingly forthcoming with support for
costs of clinical research. In 1996, when an audit revealed that most of the
audited hospitals had billed Medicare for care rendered in connection with
implantable medical devices, 2 the Health Care FinancingAdministration (HCFA)
chose to enter into an agreement with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and cover a large percentage of investigational devices.'
Indeed, the
investigational devices that fall into this covered category include 96% of the
devices in ongoing clinical trials."
In June, 2000, then-President Clinton issued an executive memorandum
directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to "explicitly authorize
[Medicare] payment for routine patient care costs... and costs due to medical
complications associated with participation in clinical trials."" Pursuant to that
memorandum, HCFA issued a national coverage decision in September, 2000
authorizing coverage of the routine costs of qualifying clinical trials, including
costs of diagnosis and treatment resulting from complications arising from

24. See 42 U.S.C. §1395y(a)(1) (1994).
25. This provision was explicitly spelled out in 1977. Expetimental or nvrfgalonallews or
Senices,PartA Intermed'agLeifer,Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCi) 28,152 (Jan. 1,1977).
26. See, MEDICARE-TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND MEDICAL COVERAGE DECIsIONS,

GAO/HEHS 94-195FS (July 20,1994).
27. See MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT IN CLINICALTRIALS, stbra note 8, at 32.

28. See i at 33.

29. See iRt
at 34.
30. Memorandum on Increasing Participation ofMedicare Beneficiaries in Clinical T'ials, 36
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1311 (une 7,2000). Routine costs in clinical trials include:
* Items or services that are typically provided absent a clinical trial (e.g.,
conventional care);
* Items or services required solely for the provision of the investigational
item or service (e.g., administration of a noncovered chemotherapeutic
agent), the clinically appropriate monitoring of the effects of the item or
service, or the prevention of complications; and
* Items or services needed for reasonable and necessary care arising from the
provision of an investigational item or service-in particular, for the
diagnosis or treatment of complications.
See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEDICARE COVERAGE POLICY - CLINICAL TRIALS, FINAL
NATIONAL COVERAGE DECISION (2001) [hereinafter MEDICARE COVERAGE POLICY], at http://

www.hcfa.gov/coverage/8d2htm.
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participation in the trial.' Routine costs include all items and services normally
covered by Medicare and provided to subjects in either the experimental or
control arm of the trial. The coverage does not extend to the investigational item
or service itself, items or services related to data collection and analysis that are
not integral to the clinical management of the patient, and anything customarily
furnished by research sponsors free of charge to subjects 2
With respect to private payers, whether an employer-provided health plan or
an individually purchased plan, there is a long tradition of excluding
"experimental" or "investigational" services and items.33 These exclusions,
typically found in the policy contract, have been the subject of frequent and
vigorous litigation.' On balance, these exclusions have proven feeble in courts
of law.3 They have also resulted in public relations disasters when used to deny
care to a pitiable beneficiary3 6 In recent years, payers, particularly the private
payers-typically employee health plans administered by managed care
organizations-have opted to cover the cost of these unproven therapies rather
than engage in costly court and media battles."
In fact, in recent years, there has been willingness on the part of third party
payers to assume the costs of clinical research, especially the routine services
associated with such research.38 For example, the American Association of
Health Plans encourages its health plans to reimburse the routine costs of care
associated with National Institutes of Health (NIH) sponsored trials.3 Several

31. MEDICARE COVERAGE POLICY,

mrra note 30.
32. See id
33. Seegeneral#Angela R. Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB. L REV. 795
(1994).
34. See e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003 (9,h Cir. 1998); Pirozzl v. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia, 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990). See also Mark Holoweiko,
Exp etimentalTreatment: Canyou do the Right Thing Without Going Broke?, Bus. & HEALTH, May 1995,
at 38.
35. See HEALTH INSUtRANCE-COVERAGE OF AuTOLOGOUS BONE MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION FOR BREASTCANCER, GAO/HEHS 96-83 (1996) [hercinafteq:COVERAGEOr
BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTS];John H. Ferguson et al., Court-OrderdReimburemmntforUnpiroven
Medical Technology, 269 JAMA 2116, 2116 (1993). Courts err and order payment for not only
unproven, but dangerous therapies. See Mark R. Tonelli et al., ClinicalExpedmentation Lessonsfrom
Lung Vome Reduction Suqgty, 110 CHEST 230, 235 (1996).
36. See Tm 0eary, HealhNet Toldto Py S1 Million, RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Oct.
18, 1995, at BI. See also Ferguson, supranote 35.
37. See COVERAGE OF BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTS, supra note 35; see also Michael M.
Weinstein,ManagedCarer OtherProbem:It'Not What You Think, N.Y.TIMEs, Feb. 28,1999, at wkl.
38. See Joanne Wojcik Kochaniec, More Insurer FundingResearch: New Coverage Stance, BUS,
INS., Mar. 20, 2000, at 1, available a 2000 WL 8170067; COVERAGE O1l BONE MARROW
TRANSPLANTS, supra note 35.
39. See MEDICARE REiMBURSEMENT IN CLINICALTRIALS, upra note 8, at 46.

WVdunerLaw S~y

osium Journal

[Vol. 8:115

large private health plans cover costs of patient care in cancer research trials
conducted under the National Cancer Institute (NC).4
Even absent the payers'increasingwillingness to fund theroutinepatient costs
of clinical research, the fact is that isolating costs associated with research from
costs not associated with research is administratively difficult and costly."1
Because of this difficulty, both Medicare and private payers have actually been
paying for a large proportion of research-related costs long before they affirtmed
their willingness tcd do so.4
Indeed, according to a recent study published by the Institute of Medicine
(JOM), coverage and reimbursement of medical services-especially routine
services-associated with clinical trials is common.4 The IOM sought to verify
this "widespread understanding" with a study commissioned by the Lewin
Group, a health policy consulting firm." In the Lewin Group study, clinical trial
investigators reported routine patient claims generated in clinical trials are
routinely submitted and paid by plans.45 This finding was sustained across a
variety of research areas. In fact, oncologists indicated claims would be routinely
submitted for nearly all the routine services used in the course of the clinical
trial.' 6 Similarly, cardiologists reported they commonly bill insurers for routine
patient costs in clinical trials, although not necessarily for protocol-specific
procedure costs.47 It appears a lack of clarity about what constitutes standard
therapy versus research makes it difficult for both provider and payer to discern
what is covered and reimbursable.48
4. Patient "Out-of-Pocket" Payment
In some instances, the patient/subject will pay out-of-pocket for care and
services received in the course of clinical research. This generally occurs in
protocols in which a new experimental procedure is being offered. New
procedures are typically not funded by federal agencies and thereis frequently no
new drug or device involved that might be under sponsorship by private

40. See MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT IN CUNICALTRIALS, .ij'm note 8, at 45-46; Marilyn
Ostern iler, Wdgirg the Cox4 BESTS REV. LIFE/HEALTH ED., Mar= 1999, at 8. Sit cao Ken Terry,

Tecbnoog:ThBiggrHealth-CareCost-DrerofAILCan
&eCurbuieRiu?,
Mi.ECON.,Mar. 21,1994,
at 124, 132; Sandra G. Boodman, BrrastCanrerRoukpte, WASH. POST, Apr. 27,1999, at Z12.
41. See MEDICARE REmBURSEMENT IN CNICALTRiAis,
42. See Rotat 42-43.

43. See id
44. See R at 38-40.

45.
46.
47.
48.

See id at 39-43.
Idoat 39-40.
See id at 40-41.
See it at42

Atra note 8, at 42.
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industry.49 Alternatively, the new drug or device maybe provided in concert with
an experimental procedure thatis not covered by third party payers or part ofthe
federal grant or industry sponsorship?'
Perhaps the most timely example of this would be the use ofautologous bone

marrow or stem cell transplant for breast cancer. This procedure has been the
subject of countless suits brought by patients seeking health plan coverage.
Although highly touted as "cutting edge" therapy by the research and oncology
community, it remained ofunproven value by scientific standards for many years.
Health plans, including Medicare, balked at covering the procedure, and patients
desiring the procedure frequently had to cover the cost themselves; a cost
typically well in excess of $100,000. Ironically, this cutting edge, much sought
after therapy, has recently been discredited and shown to be no better, and
perhaps worse, than conventional breast cancer treatments s1
B. Downstream Gain. FutureProducts,Patents and Profits
In addition to the multiple contemporaneous streams of revenue available to
the individual researchers and the academic medical center, both stand to earn
additional dollars through equity ownerships, licensing fees, and royalties derived
from the sale of drugs, devices, and biologics. Often, it is these downstream
bonuses that result in allegations of financial conflicts of interest.
Although the "golden era" of federal funding energized post-war biomedical
research, there was growing concern that not enough benefit was realized from
the relatively massive expenditures s2 Government officials and scientists alike
argued thatpotentiallyusefulinformationwas sequesteredinlaboratories andnot
fully exploited to benefit the public with new biomedical products5 3 Much

information and scientific discoveryremained at the "bench science"level. Once

developed by government money, the technology was trapped in a "maze ' of
development and marketing
federalbureaucracy that presented barriers to further
s4
by either the university or the private sector.
49. Seegeneral4 MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT IN CLNICALTRIALS, Apra note 8.
50. Seegeneralf iL
51. See Philip A. Rowlings et aL, Factors Cordatid atb Pmtrwtton.FtrtSimir.dlAffrr High

Dose-CetmotherapyandHematopoitic Stem Cell TralantainforMearta Byrast Car-Tr,282 JAMA
forBrraft
1335,1335(1999). See Lorilyn Rackl, Stuq Results Riue Doubts ofBortearoz'Tran*i'ntr
CancerPatients,Cm. DAILY HERALD, Apr. 19, 1999, at 3, araW&1 at 1999 WL 17438123.
52. See Michael D. Witt & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Con tJZcoflntern Dilavmnar in Bieam d
Research, 271 JAMA 547, 547-48 (1994); Baruch Brody, Pubic Goods and FarPdes: Bal ing
TechnoloicalInnovation with Soda) WeUlBein& 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP., MarK-Apr. 1996, at 5.
53. See Witt & Gostin, supra note 52, at 547-48.
54. See Dueker, supra note 11, at 460. The post-war growth in federal funding was

accompanied by an ever increasing number of federal agendes which regulated the research. L
In some cases, as many as 26 separate agendes could assert title to research inventions resulting in
a "Byzantine" regulatory structure. Id
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Congress sought to break down these perceived barriers to progress by
enacting legislation that would leverage federal investments in research while
simultaneously providing incentives to researchers and their universities. It
accomplished this by passing a series of laws designed to facilitate the transition
from research to commercial products."s These laws provide the opportunity for
both the research university/institution as well as the researcher to share in the
ownership and profits of the ultimate commercial product.
During the first several decades of federal funding, the federal government
adhered to the position that research funded by federal dollars was, in effect,
public property with the title firmly held by the governments The opportunity
to license research inventions was available to private industry, but this
opportunity was burdened with such high transaction costs that private industry
was unenthused and/or foreclosed from pursuing further development.s7 In
addition, the fact of public access further diminished incentives for commercial
exploitation of the research-after all, the exploiter was unable to restrict others
from using the same unrestricted substrate."s Indeed, fewer than five percent of
the 28,000 patents held by the government had been licensed in1979. s ' Much
of the scientific research and development done under the aegis of federal
funding languished unused and undeveloped with respect to the commercial
market. Concern was growing that resources devoted to biomedical research
were delivering neither public benefit, nor a revenue stream that could be plowed
back into the research enterprise.)0
In 1980, Congress passed the Stevenson-WydlerTechnologyActwhich sought
6
to improve utilization of technologies created as a result of federal funding.
This Act essentially signaled the switch to a "cooperative model" by requiring
federal laboratories to develop technology-transferring capacity.62 As a result of
this Act, all federal laboratories established Offices of Research and Technology
Transfer.'
The Stevenson-Wydler Act was paired with the Bayh-Dole Act, also passed in
1980, which opened up patenting and licensing opportunities for research
universities and researchers.' The Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities and other
non-profit organizations to retain title to inventions and products discovered as
55. Set Dueker, s.ranote 11, at 461.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id See aim0 Arno & Davis, uspranote 15, at 640.
See Dueker, .apranote 11, at 460. See also
Arno & Davis, mpra note 15, at 640.
See Arno & Davis, supra note 15, at 640.
Se id at 657.

60. See id at 640.
61. Stevenson-Wyder Technology Innovation Act of 1980,15 U.S.C. 5§ 3701-3715 (1994).
62. Set John M. Golden, Bioiecnolog Tecbnologt Poig, andPatentabio:NaluralProdalsand
Invention intheAmeican System, 50 ErIoRY LJ.101, 120-21 (2001).
63. Arno & Davis, supra note 15, at 643.
64. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200-212 (1994).
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aresult of federal funding and grants.' Private and non-government laboratories
quickly established technology transfer5 offices and expertise in order to avail
themselves of these new opportunities.
The Bayh-Dole Act also allowed federal agencies to grant licenses to private
organizations to allow development of products from the research performed in
federal laboratories, such as NIH.' This licensing capacity was enhanced by
allowing the agency to grant exclusive licenses allowing the licensee significant
marketing advantages.' However, the federal government retained "march-inrights" so it could, if need be, access an exclusively licensed technology, either on
the basis of public health and safety concerns, or if the licensee failed to use and
disseminate the invention."
Augmenting the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Acts is the Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986.0 This Act allows federal agencies to enter
into joint venture Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
(CRADA) with private research facilities.7 CRADAs provide an opportunity for
the government to partner with private industry by contributing personnel,
facilities, and equipment to a research endeavor while the private entity provides
funding and other resources.! 2 The end result of these joint ventures is that the
private entity will have first access to licensing opportunitiesOu Once again, the
federal government retains the right to use the product and subvert an exclusive
license under a "march-in" provision 4
1. Institutional Benefits Resulting From Technology Transfer
The technology transfer statutes have proven to be major boons to research
universities as well as to private laboratories.7 s Entrepreneurial private
laboratories began to flourish, beingable to offset high start-up costs by engaging
65. 35 U.S.C. § 200-212.
66. See Dueker, supra note 11, at 476.
67. See itl at 462-63.

68. See Amo & Davis, .pra note 15, at 647; Brody, sra note 52.
69. See Dueker, supra note 11, at 463-64; etalro Mazy EberlcdardbinIaf Ur 'rktLB'b3 MARQ. INTEL PROP.L REv. 155,159-60 (1999).
DokAct PubfAccestoFedra4FunddRtrearrb,
There has yet to be a case in which the government has exercised the march.in provision. St: id
at 160.

70. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-502, 100 Stat 1785 (1986)

(amending 15 U.S.C. %3701-3714).
71. Golden, .sufranote 62, at 121.

72. See iUL
73. See Eberle, s 0ra note 69, at 155.

74. See id; See alo Arno & Davis, spranote 15, at 660-61.
Rb orPtrib"toTroft orPa*h " Rerm-rrs
75. See Peter D. Blumberg Comment, From '2li
From Univesiy Tcbnolog Trantf&r and 161 ,S501(c)(3)Twe Exerdon,145 U. PA. L Rev. 89, 94-95

(1996).
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in joint ventures with university laboratories!" This phenomenon has been
particularly marked in the biotechnology industry which is dominated by small
firms that often engage in a complex web of collaborations with research
universities.Y
Beset with decreasing allocations from state legislatures and increasing
operational costs, research universities have found income from technology
transfer a veritable lifesaver.78 Moreover, this revenue stream is essentially tax
free as most universities are organized under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code
which exempts corporations dedicated primarily to scientific and educational
activities.79 This tax exemption is not iron-clad as unrelated business income
(UBIT) derived from trade or business not integral to the university's 9cientific
or educational mission is vulnerable. However, income from biomedical and
scientific research typically is considered firmly rooted in university's scientific
research mission.'
The dollar gains realized by universities from the shift to
a "cooperative model" have been substantial." For example, a 1980 agreement
between a German pharmaceutical firm and Harvard University's Massachusetts
General Hospital provided the hospital with $70 million in exchange for an
exclusive license for technologies developed by one renowned researcher.82 This
was an early example of the money that could be made from technology transfer,
In 1980, royalty payments to universities totaled a modest one million dollars; by
1994, nonprofit universities netted over $265 million in royalty payments."
Research universities are increasingly party to many entrepreneurial agreements
which provide them with steady streams of opportunity and dollars.
One typical mechanism is a "faculty start-up company" involving a research
scientist, the university and a pharmaceutical industry sponsor." In such
arrangements, the scientist is urged to recognize promising discoveries early and
partner with the university to protect the intellectual property and its potential
financial rewards.8 " Both the scientist and the university will have equity in the

76. See Golden, su.pranote 62, at 116.
77. See it at 117-19.
78. See Blumberg, sbranote 75, at 94-95.
79. See id at 102-03.
80. Seegenera lIT Research Inst. v. United States, 9 CI. Ct. 13 (1985) (setting forth a three
part test for defining UBIT in the context of a tax exempt scientific institution). IIT's scientific
research was deemed to have been carried on in the public interest, to have been disseminated to
the public through publication of results and done under the aegis of government. Id
81. See Blumberg, supra note 75, at 94-95. Indeed some scholars question whether
universities are treated too leniently with respect to profits from scientific inventions. See id
82. See Peter J. Harrington, Facu/4 ConPts ofinereitin an Age ofAadoirEntrireneudaitr:
AnAnasis of the Probkm, the Law andSelected Univesy Poides,27J.C. & U.L 775,778 (2001).
83. See Blumberg, supranote 75, at 94.

84. See Harrington, sura note 82, at 780.
85. See id at 779-80.
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This new partnership will seek to license the new
start-up enterprise.'
technology to an industry player who will then develop the technology into a
marketable product.Y The potential profits from such ventures have resulted in
universities seeking to focus their research efforts on applied research rather than
basic "bench" research.'

Universities have also sought to gain from research discoveries and
technologies by patenting and marketing the inventions themseves.' There is
a marked concentration of patents in the life sciences, especially in biomedical
areas. This concentration is not mirrored by U.S. patents in general? In the
aftermath of the Bayh-Dole Act, the number of academic institutions receiving
patents increased rapidly in the 1980s from about 75 early in the decade to
double that by 1989 and nearly 175 by 1997.91 The expansion in the number of
institutions receiving patents was paired with even more growth in the number
of patent awards to universities; increasing from 589 in 1985 to 3151 in 1998
Academic patents now account for five percent of all new U.S.-origin patent
awards, up from less than half a percent in 19803
Universities have effected this increasein patent accumulation byinvestingin
and expanding their technology transfer programs and negotiating an everincreasing number oflicensing and royalty agreements In keeping-with the life
86. See Harrington, r0ranote 82, at 780.
87. See i
88. See David S. Shi mm & Roy G. Spece, Jr.,An Intmdud'on toConJsofIn:tmt in Clid-al
Rexeatrb, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN

CLINICAL PRACFICE AND

RESEARCH 361, 370 (Roy G.

Spece,Jr. et al. eds., 1996).
89. The number of academic patents has risen tenfold since the early 1970s. Se l NATL SC.
BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2000 6-56 (2000) [hereinafter NAT'L SC. BD.
REPoRT], availabL-athttp://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/sidndO0/starthtm. The 3,151 patents aw arded

in 1998 represented about 5% of U.S. owned patents, up from 0.5% in the earlier period. Mn
90. The National Science Board has documented two trends in academic patenting. lt at 657. First, there is a heavy concentration in areas connected with the life sciences. Id "Patents in
a mere three technology areas or "utility classes"--all with presumed biomedical relevanceaccounted for 41 percent of the academic total [for 1998], up from a mere 13% through 1980." IM
"Second, the growth in the number of academic patents was accompanied by a decrease in the
number of utility classes in which they falL" Id "Academic patents are concentrated in far fewer
application areas than are all U.S. patents." Id
91. See NAT'L SC!. BD. REPORT, srttranote 89, at 6-56.
92. See id Indeed, "the number of academic patents has risen tenfold, from about 250
annually in the early 1970s to more than 3,100 in 1998." Id The Association of University
Technology Managers, which also tracks academic patents, places the 1998 number at greater than
4,800. See Cho, stranote 1, at 2203.

93. NAT'L SCI. BD. REPORT, £apn note 89, at 6.56. The vast majority (89%) of these
academic patents are held by large research universities. Id
94. A 1992 survey by the U.S. General Accounting Officebased on 35 universities found that
they had substantially expanded their technology transfer programs during the 1980s. See
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: CONTROLLING INAPPROPRIATE ACCEss TO FEDERALLY FUNDED
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sciences/biomedical trend, typical licensees are pharmaceutical, biotechnology,
and medical businesses. University income from patents and licensing reached
$483 million in 1997---a six-fold increase from the 1989-1990 income of $82
million. 5 The National Science Board has noted that all indicators show an
accelerating use of patenting and technology transfer by universities."a
Moreover, several leading academic medical centers have embarked upon
ventures designed to transform them into research networks able to compete
with the commercial drug trial sector.97 The purpose of these ventures is to
regain market share lost to for-profit entrepreneurs and contract research
organizations. These networks bring together academic researchers and
practitioners to facilitate clinical trials." This is but one more example of the
increasingly entrepreneurial activity by research universities.
2. Individual Researchers' Stake in Technology Transfer
In addition to the institutional benefits, individual researchers also profit from
the transfer of technology. As noted above, faculty researchers are active
participants in the technology transfer process from its inception." Indeed, it is
the individual research scientistwho often triggers the cascade of entrepreneurial
activity with respect to a new discovery or technology.""
The concept of the faculty member deriving additional outside income is well
entrenched. Studies predating the current wave of technology transfer activity
have found that nine out of ten university faculty members earn supplemental
income in addition to their faculty salaries.10 This outside income is a significant
addition to, and may even surpass, the "primary" income as a faculty member."°
In the aftermath of the Bayh-Dole Act, prototypical start-up ventures such as
those described above are set up by the university in collaboration with the
individual research scientist. Both parties have an equity interest in the nev
company from its inception. Assuming the venture comes to fruition and the
company proceeds to the further development, regulatory approval, and
marketing of a commercially valuable product, the research scientist will have to
RESEARCH RESULTS, GAO/RCED-92-104, 11 (1992).
95. See NAT'L Sci. BD. REPORT, supra note 89, at 6-57.

96. The number of new patents, license disclosures, applications filed, startup firms formed,
and base of revenue-generating licenses and options all grew at rapid rates, especially in the late
1990s. See idt at 6-56, 6-57.
97. See Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy AIma - Clnical Inresgators and the Pharmacrenifal
Industy, 342 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1539,1540 (2000).
98. See id
99. See apra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
100. See Harrington, sura note 82, at 780.
101. See itt at 781; seegenera4 DOLLARS AND SCHOLARS (Robert H, Linnell ed., 1982).
102. Such outside earnings typically are equal to 30% of the scientist's baseline salary. See
Harrington, ruranote 82, at 781.
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decide whether his primary work focus will be his academic research position or
his position in the new company."0 In order to maintain the former, he will be
required to limit his involvement in the new company." He will most likely
serve as apart-time scientific advisor or consultant to the company.' s This will,
of course, provide him with an income stream from the new company. The
research scientist's equity interest in the new company is over and above his
consulting or part-time advisor salary. This equity interest will allow him to share
in the value of the company and its profits. Such an initial equity position may
be short-lived as it is often the goal of the initial start-up company to be
purchased by a larger pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer." Both
the research scientist and university may then receive cash or stock in the
successor firr. 1°
With respect to research scientists in government laboratories, the Federal
Technology Transfer Act offers opportunities to augment personal income over
and above baseline salary."' 3 Under the Act, government agencies are required

to share the royalties earned through a CRADA with the research scientist who

discovered the technology."0 The research scientist is supposed to receive no
less than 15% of the royalties.' In the case ofa successfulventure, theseroyalty
payments will substantially buttress or even outpace the scientist's baseline
salary." Some scholars argue the relative magnitude of royalty payments could
seduce scientists into increased secrecy, foster biased results, and cause a
"flxation" on commercial gain.112

In addition, agencies operating large research laboratories are required to have
a program providing cash awards to innovative scientists contributing to
technology transfer.' This fosters and furthers the "star" system in research
and academia, providing not only additional income to the research scientist, but
103. See Harrington, tupra note 82, at 780.
104. Id
105. Id

106. For example, see discussion of the researchers equity interest in Genovo and Genetic
Systems Inc. and their progeny. See iufra Part IL
107. See id
108. Seege=nea&4FederalTechnologyTransferAct of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-502,100 Stat. 1785
(1986) (amending 15 U.S.C. S 3701-3714).
109. 15 U.S.C. 5 3710c(a)(l)(A)CH)(1) (1994).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 3710c(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994). See alto Thomas L Kurt, RrTLatn of Go..emfent
Sdentrt'CoutE oflntetinCONFLICISOFINTEREST1NCLINIALPRACrlCEANDRESEARcH377,
383 (Roy G. Spece, Jr.et al eds., 1996).
111. Nearlyall full-time faculty earn income from outside sources. SeeHarrington, xpranote
82, at 781. Typically, these outside earnings will be equal to 301/6 of the scientist's biane salary.
112. See Steven A. Rosenberg, Searnq in Medal Ruearrh,334 NEv ENG. J. MED. 392, 393
(1996); Kurt, s.pm note 110, at 384.
113. SeeKurt, mranote 110, at 383.
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also enhancing the reputation and power of the scientist within the institution or
agency and with his peers. This cash award facet of technology transfer has the
capacity to corrupt as well as motivate the researcher. The researcher may seek
to be a productive "star" rather than focusing on the advance of science. This
is especially true if the internal reward system of the university is also keyed to
financial yield rather than intellectual prowess.' 4
In sum, universities are increasingly interested in applications-oriented
research that has the promise of producing revenue and/or building lucrative
liaisons with private industry."' The profit from these ventures offers much
needed revenue to replace the dwindling state legislative allotments to higher
education."' The effect of the Bayh-Dole and the Federal Technology Transfer
Act has indeed been to accelerate the transfer of scientific discoveries into useful
products and medical practice."' The risk of this shift in focus is that research
will become increasingly privatized and particularized to the detriment of the
academy's traditional focus on independent thought and intellectual freedom.""
The bottom-line question is whether the academic search for truth will be
replaced by the quest for a quick buck.".
II. CONFLICTS: COLLISIONS OF CARETAKING, COMPENSATION, AND
COMMITMENT

In the context of clinical research, the most troubling and fundamental
conflicts of interest arise when the research scientist is also a treating physician
conducting the clinical trial. In such cases, this double role creates an everpresent conflict of interest, or at least the perception thereof.'
The
114. See Blumberg, supra note 75, at 136.
115. SeeAmo & Davis, supra note 15, at 668.
116. During the late 1980s and 1990s, policy makers deprioritized higher education, favoring

instead other pressing needs such as medical care, social welfare, benefits for the elderly, primary
education,andcrimeprevention. SeeF. King Alexander, The CbangingFaceofAccountabi/iy:Monltodn.
andAssesinglInstituionalPeformancein Hghk,rEducaion,71 J. HIGHER EDUC. 411,417 (2000), This
trend was accentuated by increasing calls for tax cuts. See id. As a result, univesities face annual
and continuing uncertainty with respect to state allotted funding and have an increasingly fragile
political support base. See Susan H. Frost et a]., State Poluiy andfhe PubicResearthUnie'ersi:A Case
Stuq ofManifest andLatentTendons, 68 J. HIGHER EDUC. 363 (1997).
117. See David Kom, Confla ofInterest in BiomedicalResearch, 284 JAMA 2234, 2235 (2001).
118. See Shimm & Spece, supranote 88, at 370.
119. Seei
120. See Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, When PkysidansDoubc asEntrepreneurs,N.Y.TIMUS,
Nov. 30, 1999, at Al; RECRUMNG HUMAN SUBJECTS, spranote 21, at 11-12. Indeed one can
argue that the physician/researcher serves at least six parties with interests--the patient, the
institution, the sponsor, the scientific community, the public, and himself. See Edward J. Fluth,
Conlicts of Intest in Indmutr-FundedCinical Research, in CONFLICTS OIF INTEREST IN CLINICAL
PRACTnCE AND RESEARCH 389, 390 (Roy G. Spece,Jr. etal. eds., 1996).
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researcher/physician is subject to'confficting loyalties-the classic duty of care
to the patient and the simultaneous loyalty and fiduciary duty to the research
enterprise-in which he may have an equity interest or other potential
downstream gain. The fear is the lure of profit will corrupt scientific integrity
and prompt researchers to withhold or minimize the risks of the trial." *
The gravity of such conflicts has been recently reinforced by the death of
several research subjects, notably the death ofJesse Gelsinger, an eighteen year
old subject enrolled in a Phase I study of genetic therapy.' This youngman was
afflicted with ornithine transcarbamylase (OTC) deflciencyY2 This is an
inherited disorder resulting in an inability to properly process nitrogen in food
proteins due to failure of the liver to produce a specific enzyme. In its most
common formit causes death in affected newborn males." However, Gelsinger
was afflicted with a less severe form in which stringent dietary restrictions could
keep the disease effects at bay." He sought to participate in a Phase I clinical
trial at the University ofPennsylvania in which a viral vector containing a correct
copy of the needed gene would be injected directly into the liver.'" The goal was
that once introduced into liver cells, the gene would function to code for the
missing enzyme." Accepted as a human subject, he underwent the procedure
and almost immediately developed multiple organ failure and died a few days
later.12

This Phase I trial sought only to establish the safety of the therapy, not to test
for the efficacy of the treatment in correcting the disorder." In such Phase I
121. See Sheryl GayStolbergBiomtifineiReahig~evSaut atSdmtUt m.,tt nhrr.r.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,2000, at 26.
vubng
122. Seeuornssranote 117,at2234;Rick Viss &Deborah Nelson, GeteT T
Crsvad, WASH. POST, Dec. 31,1999, at A3.
123. UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH SYSTEMS, INST. FOR HUMAN GENE TuItArmy,
STATEaiENT ON THE DEATH oF JESsE GELSINGER [hereinafter STATEMENT ON THE DEATH OF

JESSE GELSINGER], at http://www.med.upenn.edu/ihgt/essc.htmL
124. Id
125. Id
126. SeePlaintiffs Complaint, Gelsinger v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., Case No. 000901885
(Ct. Corn. PL, Phila. County, filed Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Complaint], a
http://www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.btml Qast visited Aug. 23,2001).
127. UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH SYSTEMS, INST. FOR HutAN GENE TEIAPY,
PRELInNARY FINDINGS REPORTED ON THE DEATH OF JEssE GELSINGER [hereinafter

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ONTHE DEATH OFJESSEGELSINGERJ, athttp://wwwneLupenrLedu/

ihgt/findings.htnil.
128. Seegenr4a Sheryl Gay Stolberg, TetagersDeathit ShhippFi:ofHurma Gis -TSkra
t tr
Experiments, N.Y. TIMS, Jan. 27, 2000, at A20; Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Af rFaz1ddin
Gene Test Deaft, WASH. POST, Dec. 8,1999, at Al.
129. See PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THEDEATH OFJESSEGEISNGeRf, pranote 127. Ste
also STATEMENT ON THE DEATH OFJESSE GELSINGER, sapranote 123.
130. SeeJulianSavulescu,HarEtiCsQ .atttuanditbGenT&rapyDeatb,27J.MED.EThiic
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trials, there typically is no benefit to the subject, and it is fairly clear that Mr.
Gelsinger was apprised of this fact"' However, his survivors allege he did not
fully understand that no improvement of his condition could be expected."'
They further allege that he was not apprised of the risk of death, the fact that
animals who had received this therapy had died, and that the few other human
subjects had also had adverse reactions.' Moreover, neither Mr. Gelsinger nor
his family knew the physician researchers, medical center, and university had
financial interests in the trial, and more particularly in the small biotechnology
company providing the viral vector." In fact, one of the principal investigators
held a 30% equityposition in Genovo, the biotechnology firm supplying the viral
vector--an equity interest that would ultimately net the researcher over $13
million dollars when it was sold to a larger firm.'"

This case piqued the interest of bioethicists, scientists, and the government.
In short order, the FDA investigated the case and found numerous violations of
the study protocol and flaws in the informed consent document.136 Shortly
thereafter, the University of Pennsylvania's human gene therapy program was
suspended. 37 A malpractice suit brought against the researchers and all the
institutions involved in the trial was settled shortly after it was filed.'
Further fueling the conflict of interest debate were revelations regarding
cancer research clinical trials conducted by the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center,
one of the preeminent cancer centers in the country. Two separate trials
conducted in the 1980s and 1990s have recently come under scrutiny.'
One of these trials, labeled "Protocol 126," involved bone marrow transplants
used to treat patients with leukemia." Rather than providing these patients with
an allogeneic transplant from a matched donor that, while risky, was the standard
148 (2001).
131. See Savulescu, sJira note 130, at 150. See Stolberg, safra note 128.
132. Teens FatherGene Theraf's Risks Hidden,CHI. SUN TIMs, Feb. 3, 2000, at 23.

alsoJeffrey L Fox, Gene-thkrapy Death Promtes
133. See Plaintiff's Complaint, xsuranote 126; see
Broad CivilLawsuit,18 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1136 (2000).
134. Plaintiff's Complaint, sura note 126.
135. See Tyrone Beason, TargetedGenetia to Big Genowo, SFAT'LETIzIES, Aug. 10,2000, at Cl;
Scott Hensley, TaqetedGenetitsGenovo DealLeadstoWinfallforResearher,WALL ST.J., Aug. 10,2000,
at B12. Dr. Wilson, a lead clinical investigator in the Gelsinger case, owned a 30% stake in Genovo.
Id. Genovo was subsequently acquired by Targeted Genetics Corporation. Id The acquisition was
valued at $89.9 million and Dr. Wilson received 2.5% of Targeted Genetics' common stock, valued
at $13.5 million. See id
136. See Weiss & Nelson, supra note 5. The FDA cited 18 separate violations. See id
137. See id

138. See Plaintiff's Complaint, supranote 126. SeegeneralbVicki Brower, Gone Therapy Tra_,,edy
Suit Calls Sdentists 'Islkadin&g Decepdie,"BIOTECHNOLOGY N EWATcH, Oct. 2, 2000, avaiabl at
2000 WL7388716.
139. See Wilson & Heath, supranote 3.
140. Seid

2001]

Cunng Conflicts oflnuemt in ChnicalResearcb

therapy, the patient/subject group in Protocol 126 was given matched donor
marrow that had been treated with a monoclonal antibody that would arguably
decrease rejection and enhance engraftment of the donor marrow."' The theory
was that pretreated marrow would cut down on the incidence of graft-versushost disease (GVHD), a dreaded complication of bone marrow transplants.'
The protocol was initially submitted to the Human Subjects Committee in
December of 1980, just one month before the researchers received stock and a
consulting positions with the start-up company, Genetic Systems, which
Early investment
produced and provided the monoclonal antibody.'
prospectuses touted the connection of the fledgling company with eminent
researchers and ties with the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Hospital." By 1983, the
stock hadincreased in value dramatically, and one of the researchers had accepted
a vice presidency at Genetic Systems."' The clinical trial was not enjoying
similarly positive results. In fact, many, if not most of the subjects, did not have
successful engraftment of the donor marrow."' This risk was not disclosed on
the informed consent documents used in enrolling additional subjects.'" As the

years wore on, other studies found better methods for treating GVHD." This
too was not included in the informed consent documents."" It was not until
shortly before the experiment was terminated in 1993 that the consent forms
were altered to reflect the known risks-and even then, the risks were arguably
mi nized.15'

141. See Wilson & Heath, rupranote 3.
142. See ii;FirrtApllpcafion ofProtocol126 toHa anSi eds niez' Ccvru'tte,Dec. 16,1980, at
http://seattdetimes.nwsourcecom/uninformedtconent/documetshtml(lastisitedJuly1,2001).
143. Set Wilson & Heath, mnpra note 3. In January of 1981, Genetic System gave key
investigators stock and consulting feem See The Bbod CanrarE>,i.-mt- Wh7at Hapjmd, at
(last
http://seatdetimes.nwsource.com/uninformed-consent/bloodcancer/timeline-dayl.html
visited July 1, 2001). That same month, Protocol 126 was submitted to the Human Subjects
Committee and rejected on the grounds that it poses too great a leap from animal to human
research especially with respect to questions of graft rejection and cancer relapse. d In March,
Genetic Systems Inc. signed a 20-year deal with the Fred Hutchinson Center for commercial tights
to some Protocol 126 substances in return for which the Center received cash and roatids and an
affiliated center received stock Id In April, a revised Protocol 126 was approved by the Human
Subjects Committeewith theproviso that the patientconsent form outline the rislu and 2]tentive
Id
144. See Investment Pro~pedus Touts Cor ay Ties Dih The Huth, June, 1281, at http:/I

seatdetimes.nwsource.com/uninformed_consent/documents.html (last visited July 1, 2001).
145. See Wilson & Heath, spranote 3.
146. See id
147. See R
148. See id

149. See id
150. See id; Patient Consent Form in 1993 FiRPL4 Mad. Ritkr of RLtpte and Graft Car. at

http://seatdetimes.nwsource.com/uninformed_cosent/documents.html (listvisitedJulyl.200 1).
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Attempts of members on the Human Subjects Committee to halt or limit the

research were rebuffed by the researchers who were very powerful "stars" within
the institution.t"s The researchers and the cancer center note that Protocol 126
was instituted in the early 1980s at a time when standards for conflicts of interest
were less developed. 2 Moreover, the federal oversight agency, the Office for the
Protection from Research Risks (the predecessor to the Office of Human
Research Protections), did investigate this case and ultimately
found no
3
5
wrongdoing on the part of the researchers or the institution.'

During the many years of the Protocol 126 trial, the fledgling Genetic Systems
company was purchased, sold, and reconstituted several times." s4 The value of
the investigators' stock is about $15 million."55 The Fred Hutchinson
Cancer
15 6
Center reportedly has company stock worth about $2.5 million.
The other trial, labeled "Protocol 681," involved treatment of late stage breast
cancer."5 7 A new drug, Pentoxifylline, allegedly protected vital organs during
high-dose chemotherapy.' 8 However, this new drug did not work as planned
151. See letter from Dr. Henry Kaplan, IRB Chairman, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research
Center, to Dr. E. Donnall Thomas, Associate Director for Clinical Research, Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Center (Sept. 28, 1983) (Dr.Henr7 KaplanrsFirstLtter to Dr. ThomaP.Questioning
Safo.*fAnibodierandCoqnjcsofInterrd;letter from Dr. E. Donnall Thomas, Associate Director for
Clinical Research, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (Oct. 14, 1983) (Dr.Thomas' Ripy
Detging Conctsand Warningthe IRB not to Impede Restarch); memorandum from Dr. Henry Kaplan,
IRB Chairman, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, to Dr. Robert Day, Director, Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (Nov. 30, 1983) (Dr.Kaplan'sLettertoDr.Robert DayAskng
for Indpendent Sdentific Redew); mehiorandun from Dr. Robert Day, Director, Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Center, to Dr. Fred Applebaum ct al., Associate Professor of Medicine, Division
of Oncology, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (Feb. 23,1984) (Dr Dqy's ipl Refuing an
IndependentReview butRemoving HealthiestPatients);letter from Dr. Henry Kaplan, IRB Chairman, Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, to Dr. Robert Day, Director, Fred Hutchinson Cancer
Research Center (Dec. 17,1984) (Dr Kap/an s ThirdLetter 'Once Again"Ojeding to Risk andFinandal
Conflisoflnterst, Dec. 17, 1984);letterfrom Dr Fred Applebaum, Associate Professor of Medicine,
Division of Oncology, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (Dec. 20, 1984) (Dr. Fred
Appkbaum Tells Dr Kaplan to Stop CompA'ning About FinancalConfls of Intms), available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/uninformedconsent/documents.htnl(lastviitedJuly 1,2001).

152. See Hutch Reponds, Research Center RteOonds to Timeu Stodes, at http://sattletimes,
nwsource.com/uninformedconsent/hutchresponds.html (last visited July 1, 2001).
153. See id; see also E-mal Showing FederalOffidal Deciding 'N)othing Wrong" with Undisdlosed
FinandalInterestsandFederalInvestigatorKamaMittal'rAna4ii,Questions,andRecommendationofActions,
at http://seatdetimes.nwsource.com/uninformed consent/documents.html (last visited July 1,
2001).
154. See Wilson & Heath, sapranote 3.
155. See iM
156. SeeiU
157. Duff Wilson & David Heath, With a Year orTwo to Live, Woman JoinedTest in IWich she was
Miskad, andDied SEA'rLETIME5, Mar. 13, 2001, at Al.
158. See Wilson & Heath, supra note 157.
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and soon was abandoned by European researchers." s Two proponents of
Pentoxifylline, working at Fred Hutchinson, spun off a small company to
produce other versions of the drug."' Fred Hutchinson received stock and
licensing fees in this enterprise.'
Others, including one of the powerful
researchers in Protocol 126, also received stock" The Protocol 681 ex-periment
continued through 1998 despite growing evidence that the drug did not work
and, indeed, resulted in adverse outcomes, including death." The spin-off
company, Cell Therapeutics, misrepresenting the results of Protocol 681, moved
on to develop
other drugs." * Today the company is reportedly worth $485
165
million.
These conflict of interest scandals in gene therapy and cutting edge cancer
therapies have fueled increased scrutiny by the media and policy makers.
Congressional hearings are currently calling for greater federal involvement in
biomedical research as well as greater oversight of the behavior and privileges of
researchers!' In addition, many institutions and professional organizations are
reevaluating their procedures and policies on conflict of interest.
A Financial Conflds ofInterest
The promise of downstream profits from equity holdings, royalties, and profit
sharing offers significant incentives to researchers. As a result, researchers will
seek to develop their intellectual property, usually in collaboration with the
university or a CRADA.' This is, of course, an intended outcome of the BayhDole Act and the Federal Technology Transfer Act68
Growing numbers of researchers report personal financial ties to industry
sponsors. These ties are diverse and nuanced, ranging from the short-term
159. See Wilson & Heath, sVra note 157.

160. See R
161. See id
162. See it
163. See Rofica of DodorsNotes Shoing tbat FourWmen DdFrv. te F. entntalTrrifrn..t;
Two ofFourPaientrin PrediousBreto CancerSuf ewKilkd lob
Ike Cku7trkMU;Ty
lp'nr
that Two ofjourPaiensin Ome Stud andThree ofSbc in Anotlr en Klkd &lb High.deCa h.,Ik.T
that Kath Tn Hamilton Would Take, at http://seadedimes.nwsource.com/uninformed-consent/

documents.html (last visited July 1, 2001).
164. See nT*ingto Raise Cpitalfromiml'utors,

IToutedAiwsfngjRejvrforaDr Cotiataion

thatitadAhadkCondudDit0torrk athttp://seatfietmesnwsourcom/uninforned-cnst/
documents.html (last visited July 1,2001).
165. See DuffWilson & David Heath, He He ldCreate1he Biotb B:om and IWhn it Went Bust,
So DidHe, SEATrLB TIMES, Mar. 14,2001, atAl.
166. See Kom, spranote 117, at 2234.
167. See Shimm & Spece, supra note 88, at 370. See alo Golden, wpra note 62, at 142-54
(discussing the motivation of the "hiventor" dass).
168. See Kom, stora note 117, at 2235.
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commitments to attend a single meeting or provide one-time consulting, to more
substantive commitments as long-term members of advisory boards holding
stock in the company.'69 The International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors (ICMJE) has identified the most common and troubling of financial
conflicts, citing employment, consultancies, stock ownership, honoraria, and
expert witness work, either on the part of the research scientist or an immediate
family member.' 70 One study of 800 biotechnology faculty members revealed
that 47% serve as consultants to industry, almost 25% received industy
sponsored grants, and 8% had an equity interest in their industry sponsor.'7 '
Another study analyzing 789 articles in medical journals found that 34% of the
authors had a 72financial interest in the subject matter they were studying and
writing about

Faculty start-up ventures and other equity arrangements raise conflict of
interest issues for both the university and the individual. The individual
researcher will likely continue to do research in the same area of technology and
study. This university-based research will likely be funded by federal grants. The
question will then arise as to whether the university-based research is furthering
science, or rather, furthering the aims and development of the new company's
products and interests." The line between the two is likely to be blurry and both
the university and the research scientist lack credibility as arbiters for clarification.
These financial conflicts of interest are an unintended, albeit predictable,
outcome of technology transfer policy. However, financial conflicts are not the
only problem. The increasingly entrepreneurial approach to science has
produced a change in the culture of biomedical research. The zeal to protect
intellectual property discourages the free and open exchange of information that
is so fundamental to intellectual discourse and scientific advancement. 17 Such
non-financial conflicts and "conflicts of75commitment" are at least as, if notmore,
deleterious than the financial conflicts.'
169. See Boyd & Bero, supra note 21, at 2212-13.

170. International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, Wdtiningfor Pubcalion:Conjlict of
Interest,341 LANCET 742 (1993).
171. SeeArno & Davis, supranote 15, at 668-69. In this study 30% of those who had industry
funding admitted that the funding had influenced their research and choice of topics. See id.

172. See Sheldon Krimsky et al., Finandal nterests ofAutbors in SdentifcJournal:A PilotSludy of
14 Pubications,2 SC. & ENG. ETHICs 395,395 (1996); see also Sheldon

Krimsky &LS. Rothenberg,

Finandal nterest andits Disclosurein Sdentifc Publcaton, 280 JAMA 225, 226 (1998).
173. See Harrington, supranote 82, at 780.
174. See Sheldon Krimsky, The ProfitofSdentdfl¢Disovy anditsNormatirempcatons,75 CiI.KENTL REv. 15, 35-39 (1999).
175. See Harrington, supranote 82, at 787. Non-financial conflicts encompass the questions
of conflicts between dedication to scientific integrity and dedication to the non-monetary measures
of prestige, such as publications, academic promotion, professional honors, reputation, and access

to power. It Conflicts of commitment arise as the researchers distribution of effort and time is
deflected from the academic research and teaching mission to the industry enterprise. See id
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B. 'Other" Cumndes: Non-FinancialConfl'ctr ofInterest

In addition to the tangible benefits that the university research center and
researcher receives from equity holdings, licensing fees, and royalties, there are
a host of intangible benefits associated with successful technology transfer.
Academic biomedical research has numerous pressures and conflicts. Many, and
perhaps the most compelling, conflicts are not financial in nature. Rather, these
non-financial conflicts arise out of ambition for academic advancement, zeal to
discover better treatments, need for a sustained, stable stream of research
funding, pursuit of publications, and desire for accolades from peers.17
There is significant emotional and professional satisfaction from having
research result in practical application and public acclaim."
From the
perspective ofmedical altruism, manyresearchers treatingpatients are committed
to providing state of the art care. 78 The problem is that the perception of what
constitutes the "state of the art" may be colored by the researchers' aims.
Researchers tend to be passionate and committed to their research hypothesis
and may believe it does offer the best hope for alleviation of pain and suffering,
even though the preliminary research results are not confirmatory. 17 These nonfinancial conflicts and pressures may create a powerful bias towards positive
results, even absent any financial incentives.'
Researchers and their universities benefit from successful research from a
prestige standpoint. Academic prestige is measured in terms of publications.
There is a strong incentive on the part of researchers to publish in order to
further their own academic careers and futures.' The research university shares
in, and fosters, this professional and cultural norm. Provocative, high profile
projects and positive results bring rewards of promotion and further research
funding.'
Publications lead to a national reputation, academic tenure and
promotion, and an increased national profile for the researcher and the
83
university.
176. Set Kom, spra note 117, at 2234.
177. See Blumberg, supranote 75, at 101.
178. For example, one well-known researcher in genetics who founded seven biotechnology
firms while a professor at Harvard, has stated that his primary motivation was not money, but rather
"the joy of conceiving ideas and reducing them to practical reality to make a difference in people's
lives." See Stolberg, s:pra note 121.
179. See Kom, supra note 117, at 2234
180. Set id
181. See Robert A. Phillips & John Hoey, Conriraints ofInterea:Lessons at tho HoritalforSick
Chidren,159 CANADIAN MED.ASS'NJ. 955,956 (1998), availabeathttp://www.cma.ca/cmaj/vol.
159/issue-8/0955.htm.
182. See Kenneth J. Rothman, Conftt of Interest. The New MCari~smin Sdence, 269 JAMA
2782,2783 (1993).
183. See Blumberg, supra note 75, at 120-21.
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There is reason for concern because even in more mundane areas of research
than the high profile gene therapy and cancer research cases detailed above,
skewing of study design, the study itself, and research results due to industry

financial support still exist"t From a study design perspective, the sponsor may
formulate the research plan to produce desired results." Results may be biased
towards the desired conclusion, either as a result of study design or biased data
interpretations. One study surveying publications reporting clinical trial results
found there was an inexplicable correlation between positive results and the
presence of pharmaceutical manufacturer funding of the trial. " In another
study, involving a class of cardiac drugs, clinical researchers with financial
support from the drug manufacturer were more likely to report favorable
results." 7 More recently, a study reviewing clinical trials involving new "breakthrough" cancer drugs found that studies funded by pharmaceutical companies
were nearly eight times less likely to come to an unfavorable qualitative
conclusion as similar studies funded by non-profit entities." s These studies
scream bias and throw considerable doubt on the integrity and credibility of the
research' 89
In yet another variation on this theme, researchers may vithhold timely
publication of results to protect their pending patent application or to put off
reporting unfavorable results.'
In one recent study, 19.8% of respondents
reported they had delayed publication to allow for patent application, to protect
a scientific lead, to slow dissemination of negative results, to allow time for the
renegotiation of an intellectual property agreement, or to resolve an intellectual

184. SeeSheldonKrimsky, ConfiltoflntertandCost-ef
BenusAna4,282JAMA 1474,1475
(1999).
185. SeeLisa A.Bero &Drummond Renni,.#
onihQuaofPu dDnSla ,Ies,12
INT'LJ. TF-H. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 209,209,219-21 (1996); Paula A.Rochon et a)., Thk
EvolkonofCinicalTatldiionandRepresentaton,
159 CANADIAN MFD.Ass'NJ. 1373,1373(1998),
available athttp://www.cma.ca/cmaj/vol-159/i,sue-11/1373.htm; Paula A. Rochon ct aL,A SIuAf,
ofManufaurr-SupotedTdahofNonsernidalAntiiz-infl atoq Dr~zg in th:TratrtofArthtir,154
ARCHIVES INTERNALMED. 157 (1994).

186. See Richard A. Davidson, Soure of Fundin.g ard Oultve of CldralTdal I J. GEN.
INTERNALMED. 155 (1986).

'187. See Henry Thomas Stdlfox et al., Conld of Inerett in te.- Ddoit Ot-r im-Caeanre,
Antagonit, 338NEWENG.J.MED. 101,101 (1998). Similarly, studies published in symposia issues
funded by pharmaceutical companies were more likely to be favorable to the company's products.
See Mildred K. Cho &Lisa A.Bero, The.Qua&y of DjgStudiesPublithdin$pasiwaPre/n.g,124
ANNALS INTERNALMvED. 485,488 (1996),arvaiabLathttp://wwv.acponlie.org/joumals/annals/
01mar96/drugstud.htm.
188. See Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluafion ofConfd oflnferut in EBor...Arlee ofNe. Dnvgr
Usedin Onology, 282JAMA 1453,1455 (1999).

189. See International Committee of MedicalJournal Editors, supra note 170.

190. See Ducker, sranote 11, at 473.
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property dispute. 9' Given the crucialimportance ofpublications to the academic
career, it is particularly telling and concerning that, despite the importance of
publications, studies have demonstrated that researchers will delay publication in
order to firm up patent applications and industry liaisons. Curiously, such
delaying tactics are more common among faculty members of higher rank who
are more productive in terms of scholarship."
Researchers also seek peer recognition and respect This need extends far
beyond the need for publications to ensure tenure and academic promotion. The
rewards of publicity may be more pivotal than personal financial gain." For
example, in the Gelsinger case, the conflicted researcher was reportedly offended
by the allegation that dollars swayed his judgment"'9 He indicated that what was
material to him was not financial gain, but rather academic recognition and
honors.19 The sought after "prize may be Nobel as well as financial ' "' This
"glory" factor can be a powerful motivator."' In yet another recent research
scandal, a researcher who had falsified data to attest to the merit of a
controversial, but very lucrative therapy for breast cancer, stated he had engaged
in the fraud "out of a foolish desire to make the presentation more acceptable to
an audience."' In short, in order to obtain the affirmation and respect of expert
peers, he was willing to present fraudulent data that would tell them what they
wanted to hear and simultaneously appeal to victims of breast cancer seeking a
magic bullet) 99
In addition to the obvious concerns these skewed or delayed studies raise with
respect to scientific integrity, biased research results open the door for harm to
patients extending far beyond those subjects involved in the clinical trial. These
results may lead to erroneous conclusions about the safety or the efficacy of new
drugs and devices. The erroneous data and conclusions will be used to win FDA
approval for the product. They will also be used by researchers working on the
next generation of research, creating a domino effect of error. Once

191. SeeDavid Blumenthal etaL, lIitkk lg Retar
ahRurifinAwde
LifiSdtr,,a,277JAMA
1224,1226 (1997).
192. See id at 1227-28.
193. See Rothman, upranote 182, at 2783.
194. SeeNancy UP.King, Comments on Draft Interin Guidance on FmandalRlationsips
in Clinical Research: Issues for Institutions, Clinical Investigators, and IRBs to Consider When
Dealing with Issues of Financial Interests and Human Subject Protection, at http://ohrp.oophs.
dhhs.gov/humansubjects/finreltn/comments.htm (last updated Apr 2,2001).
195. it.
196. S Ellen Goodman, Gene Terapoy tds Gorrn niReinu, NMY'DAY, Feb. 6,2000, atB7.
197. See King,iupranote 194.

198. See Lauran Neergaard, Sdentist FafiedData Spin Carxrr mn, SEATITlZEs,
Feb. 5,2000, at AZ
199. See Denise Grady, BrtCanerRetr .rAnFarF.irgData,N.Y.TIMES,Feb.5,2000,
at A9.
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disseminated in the market, end user physicians and patients will pay the price for
bad science in dollars, poor outcomes, and adverse events.
Non-financial conflicts of interest may be more powerful influences on faculty
behavior than the financial conflicts.2' Oversight of such non-financial conflicts
of interest has traditionally been left to the academic professions and the
community."' If indeed, these non-financial conflicts are at least as compelling
to the researcher, this approach may be questionable, if not foolhardy. De facto
appointment of the peer community as watchdog over non-financial conflicts
cannot be warranted if the academic culture in the institution cannot be
depended upon for diligence in responsibly addressing such conflicts.2r
II. CURRENT METHODS OF ADDRESSING FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST

Although conflicts of interest have been a lurking danger for many years, they
have only been addressed by law and institutional policy relatively recently."'
Now, there are a variety of federal regulations and guidelines, institutional
policies, and professional association recommendations regarding conflicts of
interest'

Most recently, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP)

has issued draft interim guidance on "Financial Relationships in Clinical
Research.""
In issuing the draft guidance, the OHRP noted there is no
recognized "best practice" with respect to handling conflict of interest
questions.' These draft guidelines were designed to stimulate consensus on a
greater level of protection for human subjects. Unfortunately, there is little
consensus among the many entities that have weighed in on the issue to date. 7
A Laws and RegulationsAddressingConflict ofInterest
At present there are no federal laws or regulations that are prescriptive
regarding the types of financial interests that may be held by clinical
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See Kom, spra note 117, at 2234.
See id at 2234-35.
Seeidat 2235.
See id at 2234.
See OFFICE OF HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, DRAFT INTERIM GUIDANCE:
FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN CINICAL RESEARCH: ISSU S FOR INSTITUIYONS, CLINICAL
INVESTIGATORSAND IRBSTOCONSIDERWHEN DEALUNGWrrH ISSU.SOFFINANCIALINTEIRESTS

AND HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECrION (2001) [hereinafter OHRP DRAFT GUIDANCE], at http://

ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/finreltn/finguid.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2001).
205. See id; see
also OhIRP Isues Draft onFiandalCotfl ofInerest,CRO INDUSTRY WATCH,
Jan. 1, 2001, availbkat2001 WL 15566033.
206. See OHRP DRAFr GUIDANCE, sranote 204.
207. See id
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researchers.208 Both the FDA and the Public Health Service (PHS) have issued
regulations addressing conflicts ofinterest, but they are vague and inconsistent' °
The FDA has had regulations in place since 1998 requiring investigators to
have no financial interests21 in the product and technologies they are testing,
with the exception of those disclosed and deemed allowable under the federal
regulations."' Any such allowable compensation cannot be tied to the outcome
or results of the study." 2 Payment by the sponsor to the investigator or the
institution cannot exceed $25,000 in excess of the documented costs of
conducting the research or clinical trial."' Under the FDA regulations, this
disclosure must be made during the time the study is being conducted and within
one year after it has been completed." This disclosure is the responsibility of
the investigator and must be made directly to the FDA.2 s
Under the PHS regulations, institutions receiving federal grant funds must
L
maintain a written, enforced policy on conflict of interest 216
This policy must
provide for institutional review of significant financial interests of investigators
before the research is commenced.217
"Significant financial interests" means anything of monetary value, including but
not limited to, salary or other payments for services (e.g., consulting fees or
honoraria); equity interests (e.g., stocks, stock options or other ownership
interests); and intellectual property rights (e.g., patents, copyrights and royalties
from such rights). The term does not include:
(1) [s]alary, royalties, or other remuneration from the applicant institution;
(2) [a]ny ownership interests in the institution...;
(3) [i]ncome from seminars, lectures, or teaching engagements sponsored by
public or nonprofit entities;

208. See OHRP DRAIT GUIDANCE, supranote 204.
209. "Differences in the requirements are causing problems for researchers as the line between
privately funded trials, regulated by FDA, and federally funded human research, overseen by PHS,
continues to blur." Coflt-of-Intea4 IncomuistenderCaseProbkmsforFirm, WASH. DRUG LErER,
July 16, 2001, availabkat2001 WL 820588.
210. Financial interest includes proprietary interests in the product, equity interest, or
significant payment of any type from the sponsoring company. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 54 (2001).
211. See id. See alo FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'r HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS (2001) [hereinafter FDA
GUIDANCE], at http://www.fda.gov/oc/guidance/financialdis.html (last visited Sept 4,2001).
212. 21 C.F.1L § 54.4(a)(3)(i) (2001).
213. See FDA GUIDANCE, sapranote 211. There is also a requirement that financial interests
exceeding $50,000 in any publicly held company must be disclosed. See id
214. 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(b) (2001).
215. See id
216. 42 C.F.R § 50.604 (2001).
217. See i
218. 42 C.F.R. § 50.603 (2001).
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(4) [i]ncome from service on advisory committees or review panels for public
or nonprofit entities;
(5) [a]n equity interest that when aggregated for the Investigator and the
Investigator's spouse and dependent children, meets both of the following tests:
Does not exceed $10,000 in value as determined through reference to public

prices or other reasonable measures of fairmarket value, and does not represent
more than a five percent ownership interest in any single entity; or
(6)[s]alary, royalties or other payments thatwhen aggregated for the Investigator
and the Investigator's spouse and dependent children over the next twelve
months, are not expected to exceed $10,000."9
The PHS regulations are unclear in terms of specific guidance to the institution,
containing only an undefined requirement that the institution take "reasonable
steps" to manage conflicts.'
Both the FDA and the PHS regulations focus heavily on disclosure. However,
differences in government regulations addressing conflicts produce a baseline
level of confusion. The PHS regulations require disclosure of the conflict to the
research institution. 2" In contrast, the FDA regulations require disclosure to the
FDA.m The reporting threshold for financial conflict of interest under the FDA
regulations is $25,000, while under the Public Health Service, which applies to all
NIH grants, the threshold is $10,000.' Further complicating this issue is the
fact that the royalty payments authorized under the Federal Technology
Transfer
4
Act, which are also a form of equity, have only A15% dollar cap.2
It is unclear in both sets of regulations how wide the scope of the disclosure
should be; is it sufficient to disclose the conflict to the university and/or
government agency, and is there a duty to disclose the conflict to subjects and
patients in the formal consenting process? The federal regulations applying to
research consent do not require such disclosure.' There is an entirely different
ethic and flavor to informed consent in the context of research. In research,
informed consent focuses on emphasizing the unknowns of the experiment and
on the fact the subject cannot necessarily expect benefit. In addition, a rigorous
disclosure of risks is required."' In traditionalinformed consent transactions, the
goal is to disclose all of the known material information to the patient to aid

219. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.603 (2001).
220. See Amo & Davis, spra note 15, at 673.
221. See 42 C.F.RIL § 50.605 (2001).
222. See 21 C.F.RIL pt. 54. See also OHRP DRAFr GUIDANCE,supranote 204.

223. See 42 C.IL § 50.603(5); see alto 21 C.F.R. pt 54.
224. See Amo & Davis, spra note 15, at 673. Indeed, this inconsistency produced sufficient
unease that the Office of Government Ethics was obliged to issue an advisory opinion that royalty

payments under a CRADA do not constitute a prohibited financial interest See Kurt, inpra note
111,at383.
225. See OHRP DRAFT GUIDANCE,
226. See 45 C.F.R. pt 46 (2001).

srupranote 204.
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them in making the most beneficial choice they can.'
The common law
standard requiring disclosure ofall facts thatwould be deemed "material" to the
patient's or subject's decision-making would likely require disclosure of a
financial conflict 2
In the aftermath of the Gelsinger case, Donna Shalala, then Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, called for increased oversight of
conflicts of interest.' To that end, she appointed a twelve member National
Human Research Protections Advisory Committee, designed to serve as the
principal advisory body to the department on issues pertaining to human subjects
protection and responsible conduct of human research.' The Secretary also
reconstituted the Office for the Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) as the
new Office for Human Research Protections (OH-R1), empowering it to lead
efforts for protecting human subjects in biomedical and behavioral research"
In January 2001, OHRP issued Draft Interim Guidelines designed to "help
IR3s [Institutional Review Boards], Clinical Investigators, and Institutions in
'
carrying out their responsibilities to protect human subjects.!"
These guidelines
addressed the rdsp ective roles ofinstitutions, clinicalinvestigators, IRBs, and IRB
members and staff 33 While not modifying existing law and regulation, the
guidance does provide dues as to likely future trends." 4 The guidance advocates
strongly for communication of conflict of interest information to Human
227. Se Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 77Z 790-91(D.C. Cir. 1972) (requiring the ph)sician
to disclose information thata reasonable person would consider material in deddingwhetherornot
to undergo the treatment; the information is to be considered from the patient's, not the phyician's,
perspective).
228. See g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding
that physician required to disclose his financial interests related to research that will be done on
cellular material removed from patient during surgery).
229. See Shalala, supra note 7. Secretary Shalala announced several steps she was putting in
place to effect this increased oversight. Id The NIH and FDA were charged with providing
increased education and training for researchers, research administrators, and IRBs. It She also
called for the issuance of more rigorous, more specific guidelines on informed consent, and
increased monitoringreports. Id She announced a plan to pursue legislation to levy civil monetary
penalties for violations of informed consent and other research standards. Id Finally, she called
for clarification of regulations relating to conflicts ofinterest and renamed and expanded the Office
for Protection from Research Risks. Se id
230. Set Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services, Shalala Names Advisory
Committee onHuman Research Protections;WM1 Hold FirstMeetingDecember20 (Dec. 14,2000),
at http://www.os.dhhsgov/news/press/20Opres/20001214a.html (last visitedJune 15, 2001).
231. See Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services, New Office for Human
Research Protections Created, Dr. Greg Koski Named Director Uune 6, 2000), at http://
www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/20Opres/200O606.html (last visited July 1,2001).
232. See OHRP DRAFT GUIDANCE, npra note 204.
233. Id
234. S egenem id
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Subjects Committees so that they can consider how much of the information
should be disclosed to subjects in the informed consent document." OHRP
stressed the importance of Human Subjects Committees in management of
conflict of interest and noted that it is imperative that IRB members and staff are
carefully vetted for any conflicts they may have as well' 36 The guidance
specifically states that research institutions are increasingly corporate partners
27
with private sponsors and "should not lose sight of... their own conflicts." "
The guidance stops short of advocating a "prohibition" approach, but argues for
enhanced disclosure and assiduous management of conflicts?. 8
In addition, the OHRP draft guidelines stress the need for disclosure beyond
the institution to the patient/subject and advocate inclusion of this information
in the informed consent process.2" The FDA has expressed disagreement with
this view, arguing that appropriate management of the conflict would eliminate
the need for disclosure to the subject"24 Patients' rights activists argue that the
patient or subject should be fully apprised of financial conflicts ofinterest during
the consent process and that regulations should be revamped to reflect this
requirement.2"
They advocate mandatory, enforced disclosure of both
investigator
and
institutional
conflicts before the patient or subject begins the
242
treatment.
Clinical investigators counter that providing complete information may be
detrimental to the overall goals of informed consent."3 Patients may be unable
to understand and assimilate the information sufficiently to draw their own
conclusions as to the propriety of the conflict.2 Moreover, the complex
informed consent document might chill participation in trials
and lead to a
245
perception that the conflict is more central than it actually is.
Moreover, there may be occasions when the patient/subject would be
disadvantaged by having a conflicted investigator excluded from involvement in

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See OHRP DRAFT GUIDANCE, stpm note 204.
See ido
Id
See generalyU
See id

240. See id; Consent Form is not Viable Meansfor Manidng Cofi'wrt of Interest, WXASt, DRUG
LErr, Mar. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WIL 8205076.

241. See Abbey S.Meyers, Comments on Draft Interim Guidance on Financial Relationships
in Clinical Research: Issues for Institutions, Clinical Investigators, and IRBs to Consider when
Dealing with Issues of Financial Interests and Human Subject Protection, at http://ohrp.osoph,..
dhhs.gov/humansubjects/finrelta/comments.htm. Qast updated Apr. 2,2001).
242. ld
243. See FormalRuesUgedforConJld-of-IntfeRh'e/ationsWASH.DRUG LETrEM
, Mar. 6,2001,
avoilabl at 2001 V&8205001.
244. Setgeneral4 ht
245. See iti
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the trj 246 It may be that the conflicted scientist is the most qualified and
knowledgeable person to conduct the trial' Indeed some argue that such
concrete exclusion rules have already produced such anomalies. For example, the
IOM does not allow anyone who has ever served on an advisory committee to
author an IOM report on vaccine safety!" This policy seeks to ensure that the
IOM reports are unbiased and impartial. However, it may also mean that most
of the experts and renowned specialists are excluded in favor of others who are
less knowledgeable, less equipped, andless passionateaboutthe subjectmatter2 '9
There are also questions and concerns as to the optimal time for collection of
information about conflicts of interest. For example, the recently issued draft
guidance from the Office ofHuman Research Protections calls for collection and
documentation of conflict information early in the tral while the FDA requires
a less stringent time frate. s
Given the confusion and unanswered questions produced by the conflicting
regulations and guidance, it is no wonder institutions that generally bear the
burden for managing financial conflicts of interest exhibit similar disarray with
respect to conflict ofinterest policies. Moreover, like the federal regulation, most
institutions are silent with respect to nonfinancial conflicts of interest Less
quantifiable, this important class of conflicts is in an abyss with respect to
recognition, much less management.
13. InstitutionalPoiieson Conflic Diclomsr =L Prohibition
Under the PHS regulations and the recently issued OHRP Draft Interim
Guidance, the onus for "managing" conflicts falls upon the research
institution. Once a conflict is disclosed, the institution must manage the
conflict, determine what actions should be taken to reduce or eliminate the
conflict, andimpose anyrestrictions or modifications deemed necessary to ensure
that the conflict does not bias the design, conduct, or reporting of the research
project 2 Accordingly, research institutions have promulgated institutional
246. Set WASH. DRUG LETFr, skpranote 243.
247. See id

248. See Stanley Plotldn, Coni ft of Ientmi, FAMILY PRAlCc NEvS, Jan. 15, 2001, at 9,
avaikabk at2001 WL 16499539.

249. Id
250. See ConfliSeeninDifferentGddsonFinanciCondoflner, WAH. DRUG LTYER, Apr.
2,2001, avaiabieat 2001 WL 8205094.
50.601-50.607 (2000); OHRP DRA r GUIDANCE, mpranote 204.
251. See, e.g., 42 C.F.RI %§

252. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.605.
Examples of conditions or restrictions that might be imposed to manage

conflicts of interest include, but arc not limited to:
(1) Public disclosure of significant financial interests;
(2) Monitoring of research by independent reviewers;
(3) Modification of the research plan;
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policies that attempt to satisfy the limited federal regulations while simultaneously
conforming to their institutional cultures. The result is a patchwork of policies
with little consensus.
Several studies have recently reviewed institutional conflict of interest policies,
The most notable of these reviewed 89 conflict of interest policies from leading
research universities. 3 There was little commonality among the policies. Fiftyfive percent of the 89 conflict of interest policies reviewed required disclosures
from all faculty, while 45% required disclosure only on the part of the principal
investigator.'
The majority (88%) required disclosure about
the financial
5
interests of family members of the pertinent faculty member. 5
The dollar thresholds for disclosure were frequently more stringent than the
existing PHS federal threshold of $10,000.2' However, the authors noted that
this variable dollar threshold could be interpreted differently based on the
institutional culture and values as well as the nature of the conflict."7 All of the
policies dealtwith financial conflicts ofinterest, but only a subset addressed other
types of conflicts.s Most of the policies described prohibited activities in a
general sense rather than honing in on clinical research related taboos,2 59 The
most common prohibition applied to researchers having financial interests in
companies sponsoring their research.' Only 19% of the reviewed policies had
provisions specifically addressingclinicalresearch.'" These provisions addressed
limits on equity holdings in sponsors, disclosure of financial interests in
published work, required disclosure of conflicts to the human subjects
committee, and more stringent provisions for clinical versus non-clinical
research.ma
Another study, in which the ten top medical schools were surveyed in terms
23
of research funding, also found variability among conflict of interest policies.
(4) Disqualification from participation in all or a portion of the research
funded by the PHS;
(5) Divestiture of significant financial interests; or
(6)Severance of relationships that create actual or potential conflicts.
42 C.F.R. § 50.605. In addition to the types of conflicting financial interests described in this
paragraph that must be managed, reduced, or eliminated, an institution may require the management
of other conflicting financial interests, as the institution deems appropriate. See id
253. See Cho, stranote 1, at 2205.
254. See id

255. Id.
256. See Boyd &Bero, supra note 21, at 2214.
257. Id.
258. See Cho, .ruranote 1, at 2205.
259. See i
260. Seeid
261. See id at 2206.
262. See id

263. See Bernard Lo et al., Conflict-ofInterestPolidesforInvesfigators in CniralTrials, 343 NtW
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Although all ten universities required that faculty members disclose financial
interests to university officials, they varied in terms of the dollar threshold for
disclosure.' Only four of the ten universities extended the disclosure rule to the
entire research team, rather than just a cohort of the team? 5s
There are increasing questions as to whether or not disclosure, even an
expanded level of disclosure, is sufficient to adequately protect human subjects.
Disclosure is but one of the models for managing conflicts of interest. It is
criticized for being susceptible to loopholes and inconsistency.P Increasingly,
2:
it is being viewed as "too cheap and easy" a method for addressing conflicts.
The other modelis that of prohibition-a zero tolerance of financial conflict
of interest The prohibition model is criticized as having a chilling effect on
research and development of new therapies and treatment?5 A few institutions,
notably Harvard Medical School, have embraced a more prohibition-oriented
model with respect to clinical research." These institutions argue that, in the
case of clinical research, financial conflicts of interest may undermine clinical
judgment." Equally concerning to Harvard and other proponents of more
stringent conflict policies is the public perception that research which is biased
has led to erosion of patient trust in medicine and the research enterprise?'
Several leaders in medicine support a prohibition poicy." They argue that
disclosure merely "passes the buck" to the hapless subject/patient who is illequipped to assess its importance in the equation of impending care.' At the
most extreme, prohibition would be extended to all financial ties with sponsors,
including speaking fees, consulting fees, sponsor-paid travel, and require that
industry support be placed in general research support funds.? Under the
prohibition model, investigators with financialinterests would be foreclosed from
ENG.J. MED. 1616,1616 (2000).
264. See Lo, stpranote 263, at 1617.
265. Id
266. Seegenera! iU; CinicalTrialDegn SbuM-eB ondSponsorConfm UC$FPrvfU'xjt THE
PINK SHEET, Aug. 28,2000 [hereinafter PINK SHEET], avnlabLI at 2000 WVL 8635130.
267. SeeDavid Heath, Medtl-Rerearh Reform GdnrSuppor, SEAt=TME TmS, Aug. 5, 2001, at
Al.
kizttSd ,e, BAL. SuJune
gCrred
268. See Douglas M. Birch & Gary Cohn, The
25,2001 at IA.
269. See Alison Bass, HarvardDoctor at Core of Debate Ozyr Researrb and I ntwetnt, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct 15, 1991, at Al; Liz Kowalczyk, Nen' Stqs Urgedon Urirmifj Rostarh Biar, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2001, at Al.
270. Harvard's more stringent policy was adopted after a much publicized scandal involving
a physician at Massachusetts Eye and Ear Hospitals. SeBass, ranote269.SetatoStolberg,.mpra
note 121 (describing a similar prohibition-style policy at the University of Califomia at San Diego).
271. See Kor,sApranote 117, at 2235.
272. SeeAngell, .upm note 2, at 1518.
273. See WASH. DRUG LETrER, supra note 243.
274. See Angell, s rm note 2, at 1517.
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having authority over study design, data collection, and results interpretation, and
sponsors would be forbidden from editorial involvement or pre-publication
review of studies3" Less draconian versions of prohibition would allow clinical
investigators to be supported by a private sponsor, so long as theinvestigator had
no stock,27 6stock options, or decision-making position in the sponsoring
company.

In justifying prohibition, adherents note that university-based investigators
should be held to a higher standard than researchers working in commercial
venues, because of their role in training and mentoring the next generation of
scientists.m This movement toward prohibition appears to be gaining favor.
Advocates argue that the only way to solve conflict is to remove it completely by
refusing to allow researchers to have a financial stake in the therapies they are
researching.278
IV. REDRESSING CONFLICTS: PALLIATING AN UNRESOLVABLE PROBLEM

In the wake of renewed attention to conflicts and the publication of the
OHRP draft guidance, it is becoming increasingly clear that there is no easy
solution to the complexissues of conflicts ofinterest. Researchers and reformers
alike are essentially boxed into a comer by virtue of incentives of the Bayh-Dole
and other technology transfer acts. Moreover, after two decades, technology
transfer has forever changed the culture of biomedical research. At best, policymakers and regulators will be able to palliate conflict of interest problems, not
eradicate them.
The primary purpose of the federal technology transfer laws was to stimulate
innovation and facilitate the transfer of academic science into useful, marketable
products.279 This purpose has been achieved. There has been a marked increase
in patenting and licensing activity by research universities and their researchers.2"'
This test has created a "positive feedback loop" that both stimulates and rewards
research that has practical application. On the other hand, the secondary goal of
supporting research and decreasing the federal burden for the cost of research
has not been met. Royalties recouped by the federal government equal only
about one percent of federal research funding.28 Although private sponsorship
has increased sharply, relative to government funding of research, the federal

275. See PINK SHEET, s*uranote 270.
276. See Lo, cupra note 263, at 1619.
277. See id
278. See Conflct of InterestPoi y Unification Urged ly OHRP's Koski, NEJM Editor,TI-I

SHEET, Dec. 6,2000, avalabkat 2000 WL 8519835.
279. See Arno & Davis, supra note 15, at 643.
280. See NAT'LSCI. BD. REPORT, supra note 89, at 6-57.
281. See Amo & Davis, .rupranote 15, at 639-40.
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dollars devoted
to research have continued their unabated trajectory of
82
increase.

Technology transfer is a two-edged sword in that the growing dependency of
researchers, and particularlyresearch universities, onrevenue from such transfers,
sets the stage for virtually unavoidable conflicts ofinterest.' Even were a policy
of complete prohibition of conflicting financial interests politically palatable, it
would probably be economically and practically impossible. As a result, the best
that can be hoped for is consistent, enforceable policy and regulation. This will
be easier to fashion for individual researchers than for research institutions.
The conflict issues for researchers involved in clinical research using human
subjects are the most risky and require the most stringent management. Here the
researcher will be caught between his two worlds of research scientist and
physician. In such cases, a financial or non-financial conflict of interest is
particularly charged. Regardless of whether the researcher believes that his
judgment is being corrupted by the conflict, knowledge of the conflict would be
material to the reasonable patient and should be disclosed. '
However, disclosure of financial conflicts in the context of informed consent
is fraught with difficulty. The patient may have difficulty understnding the
conflict and ascertaining its importance. The provider/researcher may be
unwilling or unable to adequately explain the issues, and indeed may be a poor
emissary for such amission. More importantly though, knowledge of the conflict
may undermine the provider/patient relationship and deter enrollment of human
subjects and chill the research altogether. So in the case of clinical research, the
individual researcher may be in a "Catch-22." If he has a financial interest in the
research, he must disclose it to the institution and to the patient/subject. But
disclosure may derail the patient's trust in the physician/researcher and the
research itself, even if the researcher believes that the conflict is not affecting his
clinical judgment.
In such cases, the policy of prohibition is the most sensible approach. If the
researcher has, and wishes to maintain, a financial interest in the research, he
should withdraw from care of the subjects and data collection. Moreover the
researcher's involvement in study design and interpretation should also be
282. See David Blumenthal et al., Raiotkmks BetweenAcademirItuituionsandIndmisti in the Life
Sdences -An lndustrySutvn, 334 NEwENG.J. MED. 368, 369 (1996).
283. Seegeneral Kom, sufira note 117.
284. This concept ofmateriality is well entrenched in medical malpractice law. In recent years,
the breadth of information that must be disclosed has generally expanded. The case of Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. specifically dealt with financial conflicts of interest in the context of
research. Se sutranote 228. The Supreme Court of California held that when a researcher hag an
ulterior financial interest, he must disclose that to the patient See generalp id In Moor, the
physician/researcher treating the plaintiff for leukemia planned to use cells culled from the patient's
excised spleen in research that allegedly had great commercial promise. leL This financial interest
should have been disclosed to the patient. Id.
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curtailed, or at least be subject to impartial cross-checking. Such confirmation
would not be a departure from good scientific practice in any case. A policy of
prohibition in this scenario is not only protective of the human subjects, it also
protects the researcher from inadvertently or overtly biasing the research,
protects the university from liability, and protects the integrity of the scientific
research enterprise. In such a situation, the researcher could maintain his
financial interest, so long as he is sufficiently separated from administering the
trial and caring for the subjects.
In rare cases, there may be "compelling and necessary" reasons why such a
prohibition approach is not in the best interests of the patient and the research
enterprise For example, suppose that the scientific invention in the trial is
designed to treat a clinically unique subset of patients with a relatively rare
disease. The researcher may be the most qualified, even the only qualified expert
in both the disorder and the invention. In such a case, a conflict of interest
might be managed by having an oversight committee or non-conflicted
investigator integrally involved in the clinical trial with the express purpose of
safeguarding against bias in the study design, informed consent process, and data
collection, analysis, and reporting. Such situations would be exceedingly rare.
Where the researcher is involved in the trial from an arms length and not
directly involved in the clinical care of the patient/subject, the goal should be
appropriate disclosure and management of financial conflicts. For this to occur
with any consistency, there needs to be some harmonization of the laws and
regulations applicable to financial conflicts of interest'H Management should
include an ongoing evaluation of the conflict as it relates to the progress and
stage of the research. At the early basic bench level of the research, a conflict
may be less important and meaningful than it is at a later stage of the research
and development of the product As the product becomes more commercially
viable and the ,potential risks to human subjects and patients greater, the
management of the conflict will need to become more rigorous and exacting.
However, even with a measured, sliding scale management approach, there are
conflicts that arerecalcitrant to management Theseinclude themacro-levelissue
of choice of research topic, and hypothesis. Individual researchers may find
themselves encouraged by their superiors, their research institutions, their private
industry spofisors, and the American dream to pursue research that has some
relationship to foreseeable commercial promise. They may perceive that
choosing an area of research not susceptible to technology transfer WIl not only
affect their financial future, but also their options for career advancement. In
many cases, the influence of this type of conflict may not even be part of the
researcher's conscious thought process, but rather due to the pervasiveness of
285. See NAT'L HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS ADVISORY COMM., FINANCIAL

RELATIONSHIP VORKGROUP DRAFr DOCUMENT (2001), at htp://ohrp.osophs.dhh-,gov/
nhrpac/mtg04-01/mtg04-01.htm (last visited Aug. 30,2001).
286. Id.
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the institutional and professional culture.' As a result, creative thought and
innovation will be stifled, with the goal of commercial worth taking precedence
over intellectual ingenuity.
Institutional conflicts present a particularly ironic scenario. Although
institutions are charged with managing conflicts, they themselves have a vested
financial interest in maintaining and increasing their revenues from successful
technology transfer. Even without articulated policy, universities and research
institutions may push researchers toward research that will yield money-making
products.
The institption or research university may be swayed by nonfinancial conflicts as welL For example, in several research scandals, the conflict
issue involved the leading, most celebrated research clinician in the institution.=
Given their inherent culture and power structure, the research institution may be
unable to appreciate that their management efforts are differentially applied,
managing perceived "stars" with a lighter hand.
The OHRP Draft Interim Guidance seeks to mitigate this byinvestinggreater
power in the Human Subjects Committees and IRBs to review conflicts."
However, these committees, despite their mission to protect human subjects, are
not immune to institutional pressures. For example, in a conflict of interest
scandal at the University of Minnesota involving the illegal sale of an antirejection transplant drug, investigation revealed that powerful clinical faculty in
the medical school had, among other violations, failed to comply with FDA
regulations and scoffed at IRB authority.' Human Subjects Committees and
IRBs are frequently understaffed and lack institutional power. They may be in
a poor position to deal with conflicts of interest, especially with respect to its
implications beyond informed consent.
One way in which institutional financial conflicts have been addressed is to
take advantage of the diversified nature of many larger research institutions by
divorcing the management of investments and equity interests from the clinical
research endeavor. 2
For example, at the University of Washington,
management of such investments is handled by offices and structures outside of
287. Even the most scrupulous profesmionalmaybe unable to avoid skewing results or making
daims that are not fully substantiated by the research-whether purposefully or subconsciously.
Reg Gale, Dodors' Disdosmre Di#mma/UntoMTies toBioteth Firm, NEWDAYJune 15,2001, at A7.
288. See Kowalczyk, s£rra note 269.
289. See Wils6n & Heath, suranote 3; Christopher Anderson, SCSrarsCM.Atnntota
MdiXal
Scboot 262 SCIENCE 1812,1812 (1993).
290. See OHRP DRAFT GUIDANCE, Apbra note 204. See afo Jesse A. Goldner, Drangaitb
Con/c oIntenmtin Biomed4JRereat-h:IRB OenigkateNIextBtSotuiorn:A
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28J.L MED. ETHIcs 379,398 (2000).
291. See Anderson, sam note 289, at 1812.
292- See Letter from Malcolm Parks, Assistant Vice Provost for Research, Univerity of
Washington, to Dr. Greg Koski (Mar. 2,2001), at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubiccts/
finreltn/comments.htm (last updated Apr. 2,2001).
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research academia. ' 3 This provides some insulation foruniversity administrators
who may have some involvement in decisions relating to clinical trials and their
management Another growing trend is the installation of regulatory compliance
officers, often reporting directly to the President or Dean, that serve as
secondary, impartial surveyors ofinstitutional practice with respect to research.294
It remains to be seen whether such watchdogs can themselves remain and be
perceived as immune to institutional pressures.
Even with financial safeguards, the non-financial institutional conflicts of
interest are still present. Institutional culture has been changed by the value
placed on research leading to successful technology transfer. Corollary to this is
a valid concern that traditional academic and scholarly values of seeking truth,
rewarding intellectual curiosity, and freedom of expression and thought will be
sacrificed.
The harsh reality is that conflicts of interest, both financial and non-financial
are now deeply embedded in the fabric of biomedical research. As a result, the
traditional boundaries and values differential between the market and the ivory
tower of academia are blurred, if not completely obliterated. The public-private
partnership borne of technology transfer has accelerated the funding and
progress of biomedical and clinical research. But it has also exacted a toll on
research integrity, academic freedom, and the scientific soul that will be
impossible to retrieve.

293. Letter from Parks, supanote 29Z
294. See genera/ Lo, sufira note 263.

